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CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A CATHOLIC
PERSPECTIVE
JOSEPH L. FALVEY JR.*
INTRODUCTION
In November 2000, the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops (USCCB) issued Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and
Restoration: A Catholic Perspective on Crime and Criminal
Justice.' This statement offers, "a perspective inspired by our
Catholic tradition to the national discussion on crime."2
Accordingly, Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration
drew from Sacred Scripture and the Catholic Church's moral and
social teaching to discuss the nature and purposes of criminal
punishment, and to demonstrate how misguided ideas on
punishment contribute to the problems of our criminal justice
system.3
Although Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration
emphasizes the importance of restitution for victims and
promotion of the common good,4 the USCCB contends that, from
the Catholic perspective, "protecting society and rehabilitating
those who violate the law" are the primary purposes of
punishment. 5 This contention, however, does not fully represent
the Catholic perspective on the nature of criminal punishment.
It omits virtually all reference to the Church's longstanding
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law at Ave
Maria School of Law, Ann Arbor, Michigan. B.A.; University of Notre Dame; J.D.,
Notre Dame Law School; LL.M. The Judge Advocate General's School of the Army. I
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1 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Responsibility,
Rehabilitation and Restoration: A Catholic Perspective on Crime and Criminal
Justice (2000) [hereinafter Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration],
http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/criminal.htm.
2 Id.
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 Id.
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teaching that punishment is justified by, and is primarily a
function of, retribution.
This article will summarize Responsibility, Rehabilitation,
and Restoration and detail the nature and purposes of
punishment as manifested by the Catholic tradition. This article
will also discuss what punishment is, why we punish, and
finally, what justifies punishment in light of the writings of St.
Thomas Aquinas. In so doing, it will show that the USCCB
failed to recognize the Catholic Church's appreciation of
retribution as a basis for punishment. Such failure limits the
potential impact of the USCCB statement and risks causing the
USCCB to advance unsound policies related to crime and
punishment.
Moreover, Catholics encouraged to take action by the
USCCB statement risk misshaping alternatives to our criminal
justice system. Had the USCCB reiterated the Catholic
Church's long-standing recognition of retribution as the primary
basis for punishment, these risks would have been reduced
rather than increased.
I. THE USCCB STATEMENT
Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration was
motivated by the general belief that the United States criminal
justice system is not functioning effectively, and by the
particular belief that the system does not conform to Catholic
principles. 6 Among the many problems identified are that crime
victims are ignored, offenders are not rehabilitated, the system
disparately impacts offenders' children, and the community loses
a sense of security. 7 To the USCCB, these problems are partly
attributable to a misunderstanding regarding the nature of
punishment: "Our society seems to prefer punishment to
rehabilitation and retribution to restoration thereby indicating a
failure to recognize prisoners as human beings."8 Such a view of
punishment is manifested in mandatory sentencing, overly strict
sentences for drug offenders, high rates of incarceration, and the
increased use of the death penalty.9
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 Id.
9 See id.
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The condemnation of punishment as retribution is only
intelligible if one equates retribution with "punishment for its
own sake" or "revenge and retaliation."10 "[P]unishment for its
own sake is not a Christian response to crime. Punishment must
have a purpose. It must be coupled with treatment and, when
possible, restitution."" The USCCB further contends that
punishment may not be imposed for the sake of vengeance,
revenge, or retaliation: "Jesus... rejected revenge and
retaliation and was ever hopeful that offenders would transform
their lives and turn to be embraced by God's love."' 2
Punishment, then, "must have a constructive and redemptive
purpose."' 3 This purpose is identified as "protecting society and
rehabilitating those who violate the law."' 4
Although the USCCB notes that the relationship of
punishment to the common good is important,15 they provide no
in-depth discussion as to why this is the case. Rather, the
document simply paraphrases the Catechism of the Catholic
Church.16 The USCCB also instructs that repair of the harm
done to victims and society requires "restoring the balance of
rights through restitution." 7
Thus, according to the USCCB, the morally justifying aims
of criminal punishment are rehabilitation, social protection, and
restitution. Retribution or "punishment for its own sake," is not
viewed as a Christian response to crime and can never justify
punishing criminal offenders.' 8
One must examine the Catholic intellectual tradition,
especially the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, to assess whether
this understanding of the criminal justice system and the
purposes of punishment are consistent with Catholic teaching. It
is appropriate to look to the writings of Aquinas for the Catholic
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See id. (stating that "community has a right to establish and enforce laws to
protect people and to advance the common good.").
16 See id. (citing CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2266 (2d ed. 1997))
("[Plunishment... should serve three principal purposes: (1) the preservation and
protection of the common good of society, (2) the restoration of public order, and (3)
the restoration or conversion of the offender.").
17 Id.
18 Id.
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position on punishment because, to a large extent, his mind is
the mind of the Catholic Church. 19
II. THE NATURE OF PUNISHMENT
Fundamental to an understanding of the nature of
punishment is an understanding of free will. According to the
Church's constant teaching, only human beings possess free
will.20 Other creatures are naturally ordered and are incapable
of acting in any way other than that dictated by instinct or
natural inclination, 21 but human beings, by their rational
nature, are capable of apprehending "good" and are therefore
able to move themselves towards that good, not by necessity, but
by their rational appetite-that is, the will.22  Consequently,
when a human being deliberately moves himself towards "evil,"
he is blameworthy and deserving of punishment. 23
19 Blessed Pope Urban V, addressing the University of Toulouse in 1368,
proclaimed that "It is our will, which We hereby enjoin upon you, that you follow the
teaching of Blessed Thomas as the true and Catholic doctrine and that you labor
with all your force to profit by the same." Constitutio 5a, data die 3 Aug. 1368, ad
Cancell. Univ. Tolos. More recently, Pope Leo XIII, in his encyclical Aeterni Patris,
called Aquinas "the special bulwark and glory of the Catholic faith" and exhorted
the faithful to restore the "golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it far and
wide for the defense and beauty of the Catholic faith." LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL
LETTER AETERNI PATRIS [ON THE RESTORATION OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY] 17,
31 (1879), available at http://www.vatican.va/ holy.father/leoxiii/encycicals/docum
ents/hf_l-xiii enc_04081879_aeterni-patrisen.html. Pope John Paul II noted in his
encyclical Fides et Ratio that the "Church has been justified in consistently
proposing Saint Thomas as a master of thought and a model of the right way to do
theology." JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER FIDES ET RATIO, 43 (1998),
available at http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0216/_PA.HTM. Of course, the
teaching of a theologian, even the greatest theologian of the Church, does not carry
magisterial weight.
20 Compare, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1730 (2d ed. 1997), with
id. JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER FIDES ETRATIO, 2415-2418.
21 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 17, art. 2, at 657
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947).
22 See id. at Q. 77, art. 1, at 934 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947).
23 Thus, we punish individuals possessing the requisite mens rea, or "evil
mind," but excuse conduct where the will is overborne, as with the duress defense.
In such cases, the defendant is said to have an excuse. See, e.g., Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) ("The contention that an injury can amount to a
crime only when inflicted by intention is... as universal and persistent in mature
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.").
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According to Aquinas, those responsible for a particular
order may inflict punishment for the voluntary disturbance of
that order.24 When a person willingly violates the law, he or she
violates the civil order and the common good. Thus, civil
authorities, being responsible for the civil order and the common
good, may appropriately administer punishment. 25
For Aquinas, "punishment" possesses two attributes. First,
the act of punishment must be perceived by a potential
wrongdoer as an "evil"-something to be avoided.26  If
punishment involves the deprivation of some due good,27 and the
human will is inclined to pursue that which it perceives as
good,28 then the human will seeks to avoid such a deprivation.
Thus, to constitute punishment, an action must consist of
something perceived as an "evil," so that potential wrongdoers
will refrain from breaking the law to avoid the attached
punishment. As Aquinas said in the Summa Contra Gentiles,
"[S]ince a reward is what is set before the will as an end whereby
one is stimulated to good action, punishment, on the contrary, in
the guise of some evil that is to be avoided, is set before the will
to restrain it from evil."29
Second, to constitute punishment, the act must be opposed
to the will.30 If the essence of punishment includes the
deprivation of some good, punishment must be opposed to the
will because no one wills to be deprived of some good. The
offense for which punishment is imposed reflects this truth. In
committing a crime, a criminal follows his own will beyond what
is allowable under the law. 31 For justice to be restored, it is
necessary that the criminal be deprived, because of this
24 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 87, art. 1, at 973
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947).
25 See id. at Q. 90, art. 3c, at 995 ("[T]he directing of anything to the end
concerns him to whom the end belongs.").
26 See 3 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, pt. II, ch. 141, at 207
(Vernon J. Bourke trans., University of Notre Dame Press 1975) (1956).
27 See id.
28 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-I, Q. 6, art. 1, at 616
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947).
29 See 3 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, pt. II, ch. 141, at 207
(Vernon J. Bourke trans., University of Notre Dame Press 1975) (1956).
30 See id.
31 See, e.g., See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 87, art.
6, at 977 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers
1947).
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excessive indulgence of his will, by undergoing something
contrary to his will. Again, Aquinas said:
"It is proper that, inasmuch as one has obeyed one's own will by
transgressing the law of God, to that extent one should
compensate in the contrary direction, so that thus the equality
of justice may be protected." 32
It is also important to understand the distinction between
crime and punishment as it relates to "evil." Aquinas divides all
evil into two categories: crime and punishment.33 When a human
being deliberately moves himself toward evil, this is a fault or
crime ("culpa"). In rational creatures, this is a crime because it
involves the failure of perfect action over which a person is
master by virtue of his or her free will.
However, when a human being suffers a deprivation that is
contrary to his will, this is a penalty or punishment ("poena").3 4
Punishment is an "evil" only because it involves a deprivation,
and not because it is a failed or immoral action. Moreover,
punishment is "evil" only in relation to the one who suffers it, as
when a prisoner is deprived of the good of liberty, but not in
relation to the one who punishes. Instead, punishment is a good
in relation to the common good of the punished criminal's
community. Although punishment is manifestly an evil in
regard to the person who suffers it, punishment in itself is a
good, but the end of punishment is also a good because the order
of justice is restored. In other words, the act of punishing is not
an evil action.35
Although punishment must necessarily be an evil in relation
to the criminal, and must also be opposed to his will, it is
32 S. THOMAE AQUINATIS, II SCRIPTUM SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM, d. 42, q.
1, a. 2, at 5 (R.P. Mandonnet, O.P. ed., Sumptibus P. Lethielleux 1929) ("Oportet ut
quantum voluntati suae obedivit praeter legem Dei, tantum etiam in contrarium
recompenset, ut sic justitiae servetur aequalitas.").
33 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I, Q. 48, art. 5, at 252
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947)
(stating that "every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a
fault").
34 When a man is born blind, for example, he lacks a certain "good" which he
should have by nature. Aquinas gives blindness as an example of a penalty or
punishment because, according to the Catholic Faith, all human suffering, if not due
to one's personal fault, is due to Original sin. See id.
35 See 3 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, pt. II, ch. 146, at 220
(Vernon J. Bourke trans., University of Notre Dame Press 1975) (1956) ("[To
punish the wicked is not in itself evil.").
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important to note that punishment is not defined merely by the
imposition of an evil against one's will. Kidnapping, for example,
includes the deprivation of a good (liberty) against the victim's
will. Yet, this is not punishment, and more is required for it to
constitute criminal punishment. An act imposed against
another's will is only understood as punishment based on the
underlying purposes of the act. For example, the act of confining
another against his will for the purpose of obtaining a ransom is
distinguishable from the same behavior imposed for the purpose
of redressing a crime. The first act is kidnapping, while the
second is punishment. Thus, a full understanding of
punishment cannot be reached without knowing its underlying
purpose.
III. THE PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT
Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration purports to
give a Catholic perspective on criminal justice. 36 According to
the USCCB, criminal punishment is justified principally by the
need for social protection and the rehabilitation of the criminal.37
These are merely secondary aims, however, and not
justifications. According to Catholic tradition, retribution is the
principal and justifying aim of punishment. As detailed below,
this is clear from previous statements of the USCCB, the
Catechism, and the teachings of Aquinas. There is a critical
distinction, however, between the primary aim intrinsic to the
nature of punishment-retribution for the violated moral order-
and the primary aim of punishment that the civil authorities'
intended-retribution for the violated public or civil order.
A. Retribution
The discrediting of retribution as the primary goal of
punishment reflects a misunderstanding regarding the meaning
of "retribution." To some, the notion of retributive justice is a
thin veil for its true motives-revenge and hatred.38 Retribution,
36 See Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration, supra note 1.
37 Id.
38 See JAMES FITzJAMEs STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 152 (R.J.
White ed., Cambridge University Press 1967) ("[T]he feeling of hatred and the
desire of vengeance... are important elements of human nature which ought in
such cases to be satisfied in a regular public and legal manner.").
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properly speaking, does not imply revenge, cruelty, or hatred.
Regarding criminal punishment, retribution is a demand of
justice whereby the criminal is compelled to render his proper
due in satisfaction of the order violated by his actions. 39
The demands of justice will differ, however, according to the
order that the punishment is attempting to restore. Aquinas
teaches that a crime disturbs several different orders: the
universal order, the public or civil order, and the order of a
person's nature to his reason. In its primary sense, retribution
restores the universal order that the crime disturbs--divine
retribution; in a secondary sense, it restores the civil order-
retribution by the state. For example, when a thief steals
another's goods, justice-restoration of the moral order-
demands that he return the goods to the owner. However, the
civil order that the criminal violates, embodied in the violated
law, must also be given proper attention. Retribution is an act of
justice inasmuch as this "debt" is satisfied; the criminal returns
to the civil order its proper due.
B. The Catholic Church's Teaching on the Purposes of
Punishment
According to traditional Catholic teaching, properly
understood, retribution is the primary and justifying aim of
punishment, not rehabilitation, social protection, or any other
worthy aim. In their 1980 statement on capital punishment, 40
the USCCB seemed to have a better understanding of this
teaching than they do in Responsibility, Rehabilitation and
Restoration.41 The USCCB correctly defined retribution as "the
restoration of the order of justice which has been violated by the
action of the criminal."42  Moreover, it stated, "the need for
retribution does indeed justify punishment. For the practice of
punishment both presupposes a previous transgression against
the law and involves the involuntary deprivation of certain
goods."43
39 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990).
40 USCCB Statement, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
(1980)[hereinafter USCCB Statement], at http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/nationallcrimi
nal/death/uscc80.htm.
41 See Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration, supra note 1.
42 USCCB Statement, supra note 41.
43 Id.
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Similarly, the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches that
"[p]unishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder
introduced by the offense."44 In his encyclical Evangelium Vitae,
Pope John Paul II echoes this teaching:
The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is
"to redress the disorder caused by the offence." Public authority
must redress the violation of personal and social rights by
imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the
crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of
his or her freedom. 45
Arguably, the Catechism and Evangelium Vitae could be
interpreted as referring to the redress of the criminal's disorder
within his soul when speaking of redressing the disorder
introduced by the offense. If so, Responsibility, Rehabilitation,
and Restoration would accurately reflect the Church's teaching,
because rehabilitation of the criminal is offered as one of the
justifications for punishment. Such an interpretation, however,
is untenable. Although indicating that the primary aim of
punishment is to redress the disorder, the Catechism further
states that, "[w]hen it is willingly accepted by the guilty party, it
assumes the value of expiation."46  Implicitly, it is possible to
justly administer punishment even when the guilty party does
not willingly accept it. Thus, the order rectifying the situation
need not be within the criminal's soul and the punishment need
not necessarily aim towards the rehabilitation of the offender.
Some have argued that the Catechism and Evangelium Vitae
heralded a development or even a change of doctrine in the
Church's teaching on punishment, especially with regard to
capital punishment.47 The Catechism gives three purposes for
punishment-redressing the disorder caused by the crime,
protecting society, and reforming the criminal.48 Concerning
44 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 20, $ 2266.
45 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE 56 (1995),
available at http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0141/ _PP.HTM.
46 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 20, 2266.
47 See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Conservatives and the Death Penalty, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 31, 36-47 (2000) (summarizing the emerging views about the
death penalty within the Catholic Church after the promulgation of Evangelium
Vitae); see also All Things Considered: Vatican Cracks Down on Death Penalty, Sept.
9, 1997, available at 1997 WL 12833464 (reporting on the "shift" in the Catholic
Church's position on death penalty that began with Pope John Paul II's encyclical
Evangelium Vitae).
48 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 20, 2266.
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capital punishment, modern developments in imprisonment
enable society to protect itself through non-lethal means and,
therefore, the need to rely on the death penalty is diminished.
The practical effect of such developments is to elevate a
secondary aim, protection of society, above the primary
justification of punishment, redressing the disorder, thereby
overriding the retributive aim of punishment. Thus, the
argument goes, retribution must no longer be the preeminent
consideration in the Church's teaching on punishment. This
argument would also seem to support the view, found in the
USCCB statement, that social protection, not retribution, is
punishment's primary purpose. 49
This view, however, does not reflect the traditional view of
criminal punishment.50 Although the Holy See has issued
relatively few statements on the subject of criminal punishment,
Pope Pius XII authored some of its most authoritative
statements. Taken together, these statements reflect the
traditional view of punishment, and are consistent with the
Catechism and the teachings of Pope John Paul II. Making
reference to the "theory of retribution," Pius XII wrote:
[I]t would be incorrect to reject completely, and as a matter of
principle, the function of vindictive punishment. While man is
on earth, such punishment both can and should help toward his
eternal salvation. ... The result of vindictive penalties is in no
way opposed to the function of punishment, which is the re-
establishment and restoration of the order of justice which has
been disrupted, a function which We have already indicated as
essential to all punishment.51
Further, he calls retribution "the most important function of
punishment."
Part of the concept of the criminal act is the fact that the
perpetrator of the act becomes deserving of punishment....
Punishment is the reaction demanded by law and justice
49 See Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration, supra note 1.
50 This interpretation stems not so much from doctrinal development as from an
ambiguity within the CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. The Holy See needs to
further clarify and explain to the Church the relation between the general aims of
punishment and the specific application of those aims in the context of capital
punishment. Such a discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
51 POPE PIUS XII, International Penal Law, in I MAJOR ADDRESSES OF POPE
PIUS XII 244, 313 (Vincent A. Yzermans ed., St. Paul The N. Cent. Publ'g Co. 1961)
(1939).
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against crime; they are like blow and counter-blow. The order of
justice that is disrupted by the crime demands to be re-
established and restored to its original equilibrium. 52
Admittedly, punishment serves other secondary aims
beyond retribution. The Catechism states that "[p]unishment
then, in addition to [preserving] public order and [the safety of
persons], has a medicinal purpose: as far as possible, it [should]
contribute to the correction of the [offender]."53 Moreover, John
Paul II writes that in redressing the disorder caused by the
offense, punishment "also fulfils the purpose of defending public
order and ensuring people's safety, while at the same time
offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or her
behaviour and be rehabilitated."54 This teaching is confirmed in
the writings of Aquinas and others.55
C. Aquinas and Retribution
In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas explains that human
beings, like other things in nature, exist within an order.56 As
noted previously, human will is subject to three different orders.
When someone commits a crime, he disturbs each of these orders
and punishment endeavors to restore them.
In the first place a man's nature is subject to the order of his
own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another
man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal
matters .... thirdly, it is subject to the universal order of the
Divine government. Now each of these orders is disturbed by
sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human
and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment;
52 Id. at 308-09 (emphasis added).
53 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 17, 2266.
54 EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 45, 56.
55 See, e.g., Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, or Miscellanies, in II THE ANTI-
NICENE FATHERS 299, 438 (Alexander Roberts, D.D.& James Donaldson, L.L.D.
trans., WM. B. Berdmans Publ'g Co. 1962) ("Therefore the good God [acting through
the state] corrects for three causes: First, that he who is corrected may become
better than his former self, then that those who are capable of being saved by
examples may be driven back, being admonished and thirdly, that he who is
injured may not be readily despised, and be apt to receive injury.").
56 See generally ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 87,
art. 1, at 973 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers
1947).
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one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another,
inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.57
There is a hierarchy among these different orders. The
universal order is greater than the temporal or civil order
governed by humans, which is greater than the order of any
particular individual. Just as there is a hierarchy of orders
disturbed by a crime, there is a hierarchy among the ends of
punishment. Accordingly, restoration of the universal order is a
greater good than the restoration of an individual order because
the common good is greater than any private good.58
There is a four-fold end to punishment. These ends are not
congruent with one another, but they have an order among
themselves according to whether they are greater or lesser
goods. The primary end of punishment is to redress the disorder
the offense introduced in the moral order as a whole. The
secondary end of punishment is the restoration of the public and
civil order. The tertiary end of punishment, which is closely
related to the second, is the defense of public safety. Finally,
punishment offers the rehabilitation of the offender himself,
which is the restoration of the order within the criminal's soul.
Discerning the disorder in the moral order that punishment
seeks to redress requires reexamination of the nature of the
crime. As noted above, crime is an inordinate act;59 precisely, it
is a disordered act of the will where the offender has indulged
his will beyond what is tolerable under the law. Thus, a moral
disorder is introduced when someone voluntarily does evil. In
restoring the moral order, it is evident that God is the principal
administrator of punishment, for only God has care over the
universal order of all things. In the case of punishment, civil
authorities do not necessarily intend to restore the moral order
in administering punishment. The primary end of something,
however, is not always the principal intention of the one who
uses it.6 ° Thus, although retribution, or restoration of the moral
57 Id.
58 See 3 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, pt. II, ch. 69, at 230
(Vernon J. Bourke trans., University of Notre Dame Press 1975) (1956) ("The
common good is always [considered] more [godlike] than the good of one [only].")
(internal quotations omitted).
59 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 87, art.1 at 973
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947).
60 For example, although marital intercourse has as its primary aim the
procreation of children, it is not primary in the intention of those couples practicing
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order, is the primary aim of punishment, it may not be primary
in the order of intention for the civil authority that administers
punishment.
For Aquinas, the human will is subject not only to the
universal order, but also to the temporal order of society.
Accordingly, the secondary aim of punishment is the defense and
restoration of the public or civil order that is disturbed by the
offense. As noted above, a civil authority does not look to
punishment's primary aim when administering it, but considers
instead its other aims. This is true for several reasons. First,
punishment for transgressions against the law can never
adequately match the moral quality of the acts committed, since
only God "searches all hearts and understands all the mind's
thoughts,"61 and only God can deliver punishments that are truly
just. Therefore, the perfect restoration of the moral order is
properly within the powers of God. Second, civil authorities have
care over a more restricted common good, namely, the civil or
public good. Civil authorities assign punishments according to
whether a particular crime is more or less detrimental to the
civil good, and not necessarily according to its moral gravity.
62
For example, although fornication is a greater violation of the
moral order, the state punishes theft more severely because theft
is more obviously a detriment to the civil common good.
Nevertheless, civil authorities should strive to participate as
much as possible in the Divine justice and the restoration of the
moral order. In fact, the primary aim of punishment often
coincides with the principal intention of the temporal authority
that punishes, as in the case of murder, a grave moral disorder
that is punished in a proportionate manner by the state.
Consequently, retribution remains the state's goal when
employing punishment. Pope Pius XII confirms this point:
Every moral transgression, even if materially committed within
the jurisdiction proper to legitimate human laws and punished
by men in accordance with positive human codes, is always in
addition a sin before God, and incurs His punitive
periodic continence. This is legitimate for a time, so long as the marital act retains
its primary aim. See, e.g., PAUL IV, ENCYCLIcAL LETTER HUMANAE VITAE 11
(1968), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/pauLvi/encyclicals/document
s/hfp-vi enc 25071968_humanae-vitaeen.html.
61 1 Chronicles 28:9 (New American).
62 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON EVIL, Q.2, art.10, at 89 (Jean Oesterle trans., Univ.
of Notre Dame Press 1995).
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judgment.... Sacred Scripture teaches that human authority,
within its proper limits, is the minister of divine justice in the
inflicting of punishment.... [The criminal] is accepting his
suffering from God, and offering it to Him as a partial payment
of the debt he has contracted before God.63
Thus, when human authorities inflict punishment, it is not
merely to restore the civil order and rehabilitate the criminal;
rather, the ultimate aim is punishment's participation in God's
justice, whereby the moral order is partially restored.
Viewed as such, we can better understand the USCCB's
citation to Aquinas in Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and
Restoration as supporting the argument that punishment in the
present life must not be sought for its own sake.64 Punishing
someone for the sake of punishment alone is not sought in this
life, not because it is evil per se, but because we are not in the
"final time of retribution. 65  In other words, God can only
accomplish the primary aim of punishment-retribution, or the
complete restoration of the moral order-at the end of time. In
this life, as we await the "final time of retribution," punishment
should not be purely retributive, but also should be the
"character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment of
the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth." 66
At the "final time of retribution," however, there will be no
need for medicine because there will no longer be any
opportunity for the sinner's reform, and all considerations for the
civil common good will have passed away. Punishment will only
then be sought for its own sake-the restoration of the universal
moral order.
Until then, civil authorities look to the secondary aims of
punishment, reform of the criminal and the civic good, without
dispensing with retributive justice. As Aquinas argues:
When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual,
there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in his action:
first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual
to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in respect of the
retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a
man ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole
63 POPE PIus XII, International Penal Law, supra note 51, at 316.
64 See Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration, supra note 1.
65 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-I, Q. 68, art. 1, at 486
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947).
66 See id.
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society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the
whole society. 67
The tertiary end of punishment is the defense of public
safety, which the offender's imprisonment primarily fulfills.
Punishment also cultivates public safety by generally deterring
those who wish to avoid the criminal's fate, while specifically
deterring the criminal from repeating his offense.
Finally, the common good of the whole is not exclusive from
the individual goods of those constituting the whole.
Accordingly, punishment must always strive for the criminal's
rehabilitation by restoring the order within his own soul. When
a criminal commits a voluntary evil, restoration of the order
within his soul is achieved by inflicting upon him a proportionate
evil contrary to his will. In this manner, the offender becomes
aware of his crime by suffering an evil of the same magnitude. If
the criminal has contrition, and accepts his punishment as just,
then the punishment "[takes on] the value of expiation."68
However, restoration of the disorder within the criminal is
primarily a function of his own conscience and God's grace. Just
as civil authorities infliction of criminal punishment cannot itself
restore the moral order, a function that primarily belongs to God,
it cannot restore the order within the criminal who must
acknowledge his wrongdoing on his own accord.
IV. THE JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT
The primary purpose of punishment is different from its
justification. In the modern debate on punishment theory,
commentators often say that utilitarian theorists, those who
promote rehabilitation, deterrence, etc., essentially view
punishment as an evil, which can only be justified if the evil
resulting from it is outweighed by the evil that would have
resulted had the punishment not been inflicted.69 Conversely,
retributivists view punishment as intrinsically good, such that it
67 See id. at pt. I-II, Q. 21, art.4, at 687. Obviously, Aquinas is no authority for
the denial of the retributive justification of punishment.
68 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 20, 2266.
69 See Andrew R. Strauss, Losing Sight of the Utilitarian Forest for the
Retributivist Trees: An Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a Utilitarian Model
of Punishment, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2002); see also Russell P. Hanser,
Punishing Hate, Punishing Harm, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1047, 1067
(2000).
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does not need to be justified.70  Consequently, retribution
becomes not only the primary aim of punishment, but also its
justification.
The utilitarians' notion of justice is different from that of a
retributivist. Indeed, the difference is not merely a divergence in
the application of a principle. Rather, the two views are
fundamentally at odds with one another on how they determine
the justness of human action.
The differences between utilitarians and retributivists are
ultimately reduced to a fundamental difference in moral
philosophy. For the pure utilitarian, an action's justness is
determined solely from its consequences. An action is morally
right if it produces desirable results. For a utilitarian, justice is
merely a particular facet of utility. Punishment is just if it
produces desirable consequences without regard to whether it is
deserved. From a utilitarian perspective, "no one can deserve
punishment; it can merely be right that he should be
punished."71 For the retributivist, an action can be intrinsically
good or bad without consideration of its consequences.
The conflicting views regarding the nature and justification
of punishment are merely the applications of these respective
philosophies. Thus, the utilitarian will justify punishment by
pointing to its effects, its deterrent effect on others, its tendency
to reform the criminal, and its reduction of crime. The
retributivist will justify punishment merely by arguing that the
criminal deserves it. To punish according to desert is an act of
justice, and justice is a good. Thus, punishment is good
irrespective of its results. To the extent that justice for a
utilitarian does not concern what is properly due to another, it is
not justice at all, but merely a form of the useful.
The utilitarian philosophy, in principle, is opposed to
Catholic moral philosophy. The Church, in fact, teaches that
certain actions are intrinsically evil and can never be justified by
desirable consequences. This is precisely why the USCCB
statement is troublesome. Although rehabilitation and social
protection are certainly desirable consequences of punishment,
they do not justify punishment. In the modern debate, however,
70 See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributiuism: The Injustice of "Just"
Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843, 879 (2002); see also Douglas N. Husak,
Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 975 (2000).
71 JOHN PLAMENATZ, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS 80 (reprint 1966).
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one cannot be entirely content with merely rejecting
utilitarianism and aligning with the retributivist ranks. Missing
from the modern debate of punishment is a complete Thomistic
account of the nature and purposes of punishment. In this
regard, the USCCB missed an opportunity to advance the
debate.
Aquinas makes a critical distinction between punishment
administered in this life and punishment administered in the
after-life. Punishment in this life, he says, has more of a
medicinal character. Aquinas says: "The punishments of this life
are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is
reserved to the Divine judgment...."72
Traditionally, the medicinal aspect of punishment refers to
its effects upon society, and to a lesser extent, the criminal. 73
Punishment in this life is not purely medicinal, but also
manifests a retributive quality.74 Punishment in the after-life,
however, is purely retributive, because all considerations of
social impact are absent, and the potential for the criminal's
reform and rehabilitation no longer exists. All that remains is to
redress the disorder caused by the criminal's offense - the
restoration of the disturbed order as its final end.
Thus, to consider punishment in the after-life is to consider
punishment qua punishment. That is, only when God at the
Final Judgment administers punishment is it administered
according to its principal end: retribution for the violation of the
universal order. This is punishment for its own sake. In this
life, punishment is not pursued for its own sake, but is seen more
as a tool. Thus, punishment is not administered merely to
72 See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 7, at
1480 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947).
73 Id. at Q. 68, art. 1, at 1486 ("Now the punishments of this life are sought, not
for their own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution, but in their
character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the
good of the commonwealth. .. ").
74 Aquinas says punishment is "[more] medical.., than retributive." ST.
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-11, Q. 66, art. 7, at 1480 (Fathers of
the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947) (emphasis
added). Some translations render this as "[plenalties imposed in this life are
corrective rather than retributive," a critical difference for our purposes. The Latin,
however, unmistakably shows this to be inaccurate--"poenae praesentis vitae magis
sunt medicinales quam retributivae:" penalties imposed in this life are more
corrective rather than retributive. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt.
II-II, Q. 66, art. 7, at 1480 (Marcus Lefebure, O.P. trans., Blackfriars 1975)
(emphasis added).
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redress a disorder, but also for certain medicinal purposes. In so
doing, however, we are not really speaking about punishment at
all, because the medicinal effects are goods brought about by
means of punishment. If punishment were only administered in
this life for its medicinal effects, then the same effects could be
achieved through punishing the innocent, assuming the public
perceived the innocent to be guilty.7 5 But this ceases to be
punishment, except in some equivocal sense, because
punishment presupposes guilt. Thus, all punishments, even in
this life, must be retributive, not simply medicinal, for by its
very nature punishment ceases to exist if it is not given
according to what the criminal deserves.
Among the competing modern theories on the justification of
punishment, only retribution considers what is just, or what the
criminal's actions deserve. Regarding the other "justifications"
often given for punishment, C.S. Lewis wrote:
There is no sense in talking about a 'just deterrent' or a 'just
cure.' We demand of a deterrent not whether it is just but
whether it will deter. We demand of a cure not whether it is
just but whether it succeeds. Thus when we cease to consider
what the criminal deserves and consider only what will cure
him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him from the
sphere of justice altogether.76
CONCLUSION
In summary, Aquinas teaches that crime is an evil infraction
against a prescribed order in which the criminal indulges his
own will beyond what is allowable under a given law.
Punishment is a proportionate evil imposed against the will of
the criminal, administered by one responsible for a particular
order, in an attempt to restore the disturbance caused by the
crime. But because every person is subject to several different
orders, each of which is disturbed by crime, the aim of criminal
punishment will vary insofar as it endeavors to restore each of
these orders. The primary aim of punishment is retribution, or
the restoration of the universal order, because the common good
75 See generally I THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 478-483 (John Bowring ed.,
Russel & Russel, Inc. 1962) (discussing the punishment of the innocent).
76 C.S. LEWIS, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in GOD IN THE DOCK
287, 288 (Walter Hooper ed., William B. Eerdmans Pubrg. Co., reprint 1972) (1970).
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to which the universe is ordered is greater than the good of any
other order. The secondary aim of punishment is the restoration
of the civil or public order. The tertiary aim of punishment,
which is closely related to the second, is the defense of public
safety. Finally, punishment aims at the rehabilitation of the
criminal, or the restoration of the order within the criminal's
soul.
The Catholic Church has consistently taught that
retribution is the primary aim of punishment. This is clear from
previous statements of the USCCB, the Catechism, and the
teachings of Aquinas and Popes Pius XII and John Paul II.
There is critical distinction, however, between the primary aim
intrinsic to the nature of punishment -retribution for the
violated moral order-and the primary aim of punishment
intended by temporal authorities-retribution for the violated
public or civil order.
Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration, however,
misrepresents this view of criminal justice by focusing instead on
rehabilitation and societal protection. Criminal rehabilitation
and social protection are indeed legitimate goals, but they are
not the primary aims, nor are they justifications for the infliction
of punishment. Consequently, the USCCB statement does not
provide a full representation of the Catholic perspective on
punishment. Although it raises many accurate observations and
valid concerns, it fails to acknowledge the consistent Catholic
teaching that the primary and justifying purpose of punishment
is retribution. Such failure limits the potential impact of the
USCCB statement, and risks advancement of unsound policies
related to crime and punishment.
Despite its theoretical flaws, Responsibility, Rehabilitation,
and Restoration affirms certain perennial truths about
punishment, such as the existence of free will as the basis of
responsibility, the importance of providing opportunities for the
criminal's reform, the need for social protection and crime
prevention, and the necessity of a stable family life as an
element in reducing crime. Thus, it would be unfair to dismiss
this document as a whole.
Ultimately, however, Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and
Restoration may be indicative of a profound misunderstanding
regarding man, crime, and society. In a way, this statement
represents a form of extreme autonomy, in which the individual
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"good" is substituted for the primacy of the common good. The
hierarchy of ends that punishment achieves is turned on its
head, and rehabilitation of the criminal becomes the greatest
good, while restoration of the common good and the universal
order to which the criminal belongs is virtually dismissed.
Although criminal rehabilitation and social protection are
legitimate goals, the USCCB failed the Church by not affirming
the consistent Catholic teaching that the primary and justifying
purpose of punishment is retribution.
